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RECONSTRUCTING THE SELF: 
A GOFFMANIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In his influential study The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,1 Erving 
Goffman provides an insightful account of the formation of social selves. 
Goffman’s work has been extensively discussed in the literature.2 Yet, the 
presuppositional underpinnings, let alone the socio-ontological implications, 
of his conception of personhood have not been systematically examined. The 
main reason for the lack of methodical engagement with the principal 
assumptions that lie at the heart of Goffman’s theory of the self is that his 
approach is widely regarded as an eclectic account that, while drawing on 
different sociological traditions, does not make any claim to universal 
validity.3 
The persuasiveness of the contention that Goffman’s analysis of the self 
cannot be reduced to a general theory of human personhood appears to be 
confirmed by the fact that both supporters and detractors of his sociological 
project tend to agree that it would be misleading to identify his oeuvre with 
only one particular school of thought. On this view, it would be erroneous to 
deduce a foundational framework of sociological investigation from his 
numerous studies concerned with the interaction between self and society. 
The aim of this essay is to challenge this interpretation by demonstrating that, 
in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman provides a fairly 
systematic account of human personhood. More significantly, this enquiry 
suggests that a fine-grained examination of Goffman’s key concepts permits 
us to propose an outline of a general theory of the human self. In the final 
section, attention will be drawn to several controversial 
  
 
 
 
 
issues that arise when faced with the task of assessing both the strengths and 
the weaknesses of Goffman’s account of the self. 
To be clear, in what follows no attempt will be undertaken to do justice to 
the entire complexity of Goffman’s intellectual accomplishments.  Rather, the 
analysis will focus on Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 
illustrating that it contains a series of fundamental presuppositions about the 
construction of human selfhood. Before embarking upon the ambitious task 
of developing an outline of a general theory of the self, however, it seems 
reasonable to situate Goffman’s work in the field of sociological research. 
Aware of the wide-ranging scope and multi-thematic spirit of Goffman’s 
writings,4 most commentators share the position that his perspective may be 
described as a dramaturgical approach to social life.5 According to this 
reading of his oeuvre, Goffman’s sociology possesses five essential features, 
which shall be considered in subsequent sections. 
First, as a micro-sociological account, Goffman’s approach centres on the 
study of everyday life. Macro-sociological frameworks seek to explore the 
nature of society, of which they tend to conceive in terms of a structural 
totality. Micro-sociological frameworks, on the other hand, aim to grasp the 
constitution of sociality, which they tend to interpret in terms of an 
experienced reality. Macro-sociological accounts are concerned, above all, 
with Gesellschaft, understood as a conglomerate of interconnected actors 
whose existence lies beyond the horizon of their immediate experience of the 
world. By contrast, micro-sociological accounts grapple, first and foremost, 
with Gemeinschaft, defined as a community of interconnected actors whose 
existence lies within the horizon of their immediate experience of the world.6 
If macro-sociological studies seek to uncover the systemic structures that 
make social order possible, micro-sociological studies aim to understand the 
quotidian practices that involve particular forms of social interaction. Since 
Goffman’s writings flesh out the intricacies inherent in the presentation of self 
in everyday life, his work falls, unambiguously, into the area of micro-
sociology. Within the Goffmanian architecture of the social, the reality of 
everyday life is placed at centre stage: the ordinary reality of the lifeworld — 
epitomized in the normative force of quotidian interactions, as well as in the 
mundane character of habits and routines — possesses a foundational status 
in the daily unfolding of social existence. 
Second, as an interactionist account, Goffman’s approach focuses on the 
study of human interaction. As such, it sheds light on the intersubjective 
aspects that allow for the construction of the human self. Interactionist 
programmes scrutinize the ways in which performative subjects relate to one 
another in their everyday lives in order to grasp how they participate 
  
 
 
 
 
in, attribute meaning to and act upon the world. Far from existing simply for 
themselves as entirely independent and isolated entities, human selves live 
their lives with and through other human selves. Only insofar as we are able 
to relate to our human fellows are we capable of relating to ourselves. Our 
encounter with life is an encounter both with ourselves and with other selves: 
our encounter with our subjectivity is pervaded by our experience of society, 
just as our encounter with society is impregnated with our experience of 
subjectivity. As interactional beings, whose principal existential reference 
point is their lifeworld, we need to be exposed to and involved in shared 
practices. We encounter the facticity of worldly objectivity by referring to the 
parameters of validity acquired through our experiences of life-worldly 
intersubjectivity. Put differently, we face up to our immersion in reality by 
engaging in face-to-face interactions with other members of society. 
Third, as a communicational account, Goffman’s approach attaches 
considerable importance to the study of human language. Language is a 
crucial component of the human universe. Subjects capable of speech, 
reflection and action are entities equipped with species-constitutive resources 
permitting them to participate in processes of linguistically mediated forms of 
communication. Language allows for the possibility of establishing 
reflectively coordinated and discursively motivated modes of coexistence. In 
human societies, both the constitution and the development of everyday 
interactions cannot be dissociated from intersubjective processes based on 
ordinary communication. Not only do humans have a deep-seated need to 
relate to others in order to be able to relate to themselves as well as to their 
environment, but, in addition, they have a profound desire to find their place 
in the world by seeking to be understood by fellow members of their species. 
In fact, linguistically mediated communication enables human subjects to 
translate the apparent givenness of reality into a matter of contemplation when 
engaging in speech acts aimed at discourse, questioning and deliberation. 
Speaking animals attribute meaning to life by mobilizing the interpretive 
resources of their language. 
Fourth, as a pragmatist account, Goffman’s approach is concerned with 
the study of social practices. What we need to understand in order to explain 
the elasticity of social life is the preponderance of ‘practical reason’ over 
‘theoretical reason’: our ‘know-how’ is more important for the functioning 
of society than our ‘know-that’. The former enables us to contribute — 
directly and routinely — to the everyday construction of the world. The latter 
permits us to describe, to analyse, to interpret, to explain and to make 
judgements about different aspects of the world. 
  
 
 
 
 
To the extent that we, as ordinary actors, are expected to cope with a large 
variety of real-life issues that are thrown at us by the outside world, the 
intuitive command of practical knowledge obtains ontological primacy over 
the discursive mastery of theoretical knowledge. The smooth functioning of 
the social world depends on our intuitive capacity to engage in life practices, 
rather than on our critical capacity to reflect upon life premises. Indeed, in a 
radical sense, the ultimate premise of social life is human practice. 
Fifth, as a dramaturgical account, Goffman’s approach proposes to take 
seriously the study of role performances. In essence, dramaturgical 
frameworks explore the social world as if it were a sequence of theatrical 
scenes. Given that, in Goffman’s writings, social encounters are analysed ‘by 
drawing upon metaphors from and analogies with the theatre’,7 his work is 
often referred to as ‘dramaturgical’.8 As performers living in increasingly 
complex societies, we are expected to be able to adopt multiple — often 
contradictory and often competing — roles. Social roles are a constitutive 
component of human life. In order to become fully-fledged members of 
society, we need to prove that we are capable of slipping into different roles, 
without whose existence there would be no division of tasks, positions and 
responsibilities within small-scale or large-scale communities. Every time we 
take on a social role, we confirm both the performativity and the contingency 
of our personality: the performativity of our personality stems from the fact 
that we need to act upon our environment, and the contingency of our 
personality is due to the fact that we need to adapt to our environment. To the 
degree that our engagement with the world is mediated by the construction 
and adoption of different social roles, our immersion in reality depends on our 
performative and assimilative engagement with the expectation-laden 
construction of our communities. 
In short, from a Goffmanian point of view, human life is composed of five 
essential features: quotidianity, interactionality, linguisticality, functionality 
and performativity. First, the importance of everyday life is due to the 
quotidian nature of our immediate experience of the world. Second, the 
centrality of social interaction stems from the intersubjective nature of 
selfhood. Third, the power of linguistic communication is rooted in the 
meaning-laden nature of human existence. Fourth, the prevalence of social 
practices manifests itself in the preponderance of the pragmatic nature of 
social life. Finally, the power of social performances is expressed in the 
assimilative nature of our engagement with the expectation-laden 
construction of our communities. 
These five presuppositions lie at the heart of the Goffmanian architecture 
of the social, emphasizing the significance of the micro-sociological, 
  
 
 
 
 
interactional, communicational, practical and dramaturgical aspects of 
culturally constructed realities. Yet, taking into account that ‘Goffman 
consciously avoided the development of a consistent theoretical frame of 
reference’,9 and given that it would be reductive to associate his work with 
one single doctrine, both his advocates and his critics have drawn attention  to 
the eclectic, and seemingly unsystematic, nature of his writings. In this light, 
it appears that there is little, if any, room for proposing  a  Goffmanian outline 
of a general theory of the human self. Without denying Goffman’s resistance 
to conceptual pigeonholing and his refusal to confine himself to the defence 
of one particular paradigm, the following sections seek to demonstrate that 
his The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life contains a set of foundational 
assumptions about the construction of personhood. If this holds true, Goffman 
— perhaps, unwittingly — offers a theoretical framework that succeeds in 
shedding light on the key features underlying the emergence of the human 
self.10 
 
 
 
1. THE INFORMATION-GATHERING SELF 
Human selves are information-gathering selves. ‘When an individual enters 
the presence of others, they commonly seek to acquire information about  him 
[or her] or to bring into play information about him [or her] already 
possessed.’11  In other words, when engaging in social interaction, we aim   to 
obtain information about one another so that  we  can  relate  to  each  other 
in an — at least seemingly — appropriate, receptive and knowledgeable 
fashion. 
 
Information about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling others to know in 
advance what he [or she] will expect of them and what they may expect of him [or her]. 
Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to act in order to call forth a desired 
response from him [or her].12 
There are five main reasons why we are information-gathering entities. 
 
(a) Our information-seeking attitude is linked to our interactional nature. 
Only insofar as we are able to attain information about one another      are 
we in a position to generate both sustainable and meaningful forms of 
social interaction. The relative continuity, stability and predictability of 
social interaction depend on its protagonists’ capacity to develop a sense 
of trust, solidarity and mutual expectations. 
  
 
 
 
 
(b) Our information-seeking attitude is linked to our expectational nature. 
Possessing at least a minimal amount of information about the people 
with whom we interact is a precondition for guiding our conduct in 
accordance with the expectations that are implicit in particular social 
encounters. Information about others permits us to define the interactional 
situation in which we find ourselves immersed. 
(c) Our information-seeking attitude is linked to our conventional nature. Most 
social actions are — albeit, for the most part, implicitly — codified. In the 
majority of cases, we seek to acquire information about the persons with 
whom we engage in interactions, in order to ensure that we behave 
appropriately. Access to information about our immediately experienced 
fellow human beings is a requirement for the emergence of empirically 
viable patterns of interaction, based on the establishment of norms, rules 
and conventions. 
(d) Our information-seeking attitude is linked to our judgemental nature. 
Every time we engage in social interactions, we — consciously or 
unconsciously — make assumptions about those involved in the 
encounter. Every perception of the other compels us to make judgements 
about the other. Our experience of fellow members of society cannot be 
divorced from our cognitive projection of biases and assessments upon 
reality. 
(e) Our information-seeking attitude is linked to our spatiotemporal nature. 
As embodied actors, we are both spatially and temporally situated, that is, 
we occupy particular positions in both space and time. Given the 
contextual contingency of our encounters with worldly realities, we 
constantly need to obtain information about our environment,   in order 
to cope with the burden of agency. Different situations require different 
pieces of information: we seek to acquire knowledge about the world in 
order to be able to relate to the world. 
In short, it is due to our interactional, expectational, conventional, 
judgemental and spatiotemporal nature that we, as human beings, are 
information-gathering selves. 
 
 
2. THE IMPRESSION-DEPENDENT SELF 
Human selves are impression-dependent selves. Impressions are a guiding 
force in our everyday existence. Our engagement with the world is shaped by 
our impressions of the world. In our everyday interactions, we need to 
  
 
 
 
 
be able to have perceptions of others in order to interact with them. 
Impressions are immensely powerful because they can decide what we think 
of others and what others think of us. Insofar as we, as human actors, 
participate in the construction of society, we are involved in a double 
hermeneutics of expressions and impressions. On the one hand, we have 
impressions of others, relying on our perceptions of reality in general and of 
the people with whom we interact in particular. On the other hand, others have 
impressions of us, which is why, on most occasions, we seek to evoke 
favourable perceptions of our personality. Thus, we are not only substantially 
influenced by the impressions we have of others, but also eager to have an 
impact on the impressions others may, or may not, have of us. 
‘In everyday life, of course, there is a clear understanding that first 
impressions are important.’13 Indeed, ‘getting off on the right foot’,14 or failing 
to do so, can have far-reaching consequences for the course of our actions and 
interactions. Impression management, then, is a dramaturgical virtue: being 
able to manage the impressions that others may have of us endows us with the 
power to create a picture that others have of us. ‘The expressiveness of the 
individual (and therefore his [or her] capacity to give impressions)’15 is the 
basis of the impressiveness of the individual (and therefore his [or her] 
capacity to convey expressions). Following the logic of a successful form of 
impression management, ‘the individual will have to act so that he [or she] 
intentionally or unintentionally expresses himself [or herself], and the others 
will in turn have to be impressed in some way by him [or by her].’16 The 
unfolding of social life is inconceivable without the perpetual interplay 
between expressions and impressions. 
To be sure, in the course of further interaction with individual or collective 
subjects, first impressions can be either confirmed or contradicted. 
Performatively sustained spheres of existence are marked by the fundamental 
difference between appearance and substance, that is, between a surface 
reality, whose components are visible, and a core reality, whose features are 
hidden.17 The two existentialist questions arising in this context can be 
synthesized as follows: ‘Do you want to be who you appear to be? Or, do you 
want to appear to be who you are?’ To the extent that Goffman was a 
sociologist of everyday reality, rather than a philosopher of morality, he was 
interested in the pragmatics, rather than in the ethics, of social interactions. 
On his — arguably pragmatist — account, we cannot escape what may be 
described as the ‘performative circle’ of human life: we often avoid appearing 
to be who we are (for instance, with the aim of hiding our weaknesses or 
undesirable qualities, which form part of our personality), and we 
  
 
 
 
 
often pretend to be who we are not (for instance, with the aim of making 
others believe that we possess certain strengths or  desirable  qualities, with 
which — in fact — we are not equipped). Irrespective of whether 
impressions are accurate or misleading, they are remarkably powerful in 
terms of the impact they have on the ways in which we interact with others 
as well as on the ways in which others interact with us. 
 
 
 
3. THE PERFORMATIVE SELF 
Human selves are performative selves. ‘People are constantly monitoring 
themselves, masking bits of their selves and accentuating other aspects. The 
way we dress, the way we speak, our gestures — all these are meant both to 
convey and [to] conceal who we are.’18 By definition, social practices are 
carried out by performative selves. For there is no social action without social 
performance. Performance, however, is a double-edged sword: on    the one 
hand, it enables us to reveal particular aspects  of  our personality; on the other 
hand, it permits us to conceal particular aspects of our personality. Our 
capacity to reveal specific elements of who we are to others gives us the 
opportunity to disclose those facets of our subjectivity that we wish   to make 
accessible to others. Our capacity to conceal specific elements of who we are 
to others provides us with the competence to cover up those facets of our 
subjectivity that we wish to hide from others. In order to participate in 
processes of social interaction, we need to engage in the tension-laden 
dialectic of disclosure and disguise. 
Even when seeking to reveal something about ourselves to others, we draw 
attention away from other aspects of our personality. There is no form of 
social interaction through which we can disclose everything about ourselves. 
Even when seeking to conceal something about ourselves from others, we 
draw attention to some aspects of our personality. There is no form  of  social  
interaction through which we can hide everything  about ourselves. 
[…] the performance of an individual accentuates certain matters and conceals others . If 
we see perception as a form of contact and communion, then control over what is 
perceived is control over contact that is made, and the limitation and regulation of   what 
is shown is a limitation and regulation of contact.19 
Put differently, control over our contact with others depends on control 
over our contact with ourselves: the performances in which we engage in 
  
 
 
 
 
relation to others are always performances in which we engage in relation   to 
ourselves. 
 
 
4. THE INTERESTED SELF 
Human selves are interested selves. To be more precise, human selves are both 
interest-laden and interest-driven selves.20 Since we are interest-laden selves, our 
actions are permeated by a series of interests. Since we are interest-driven selves, 
our actions can be motivated by a series of interests. All social actions are interest-
laden; as such, they are pervaded by a variety of interests, which individuals may 
have both as members of society and as members of humanity. Some social 
actions are interest-driven; as such, they are determined by particular 
interests, which individuals may have both as members of society and as 
members of humanity.21 
In the Goffmanian universe of social interactions, the central importance 
of interests is inextricably linked to the existential significance of 
performances: in everyday interactions, ‘the individual is likely to present 
himself [or herself] in a light that is favourable to him [or her] ’.22 We seek to 
‘come across’ in such a way that our bodily control over ourselves gives — 
or, at least, appears to give — us a certain amount of performative command 
over the situation in which we find ourselves. Our capacity to engage in social 
interactions is inconceivable without our ability to exercise at least a minimal 
degree of power over the external perception of our subjectivity. ‘[W]hen an 
individual appears in the presence of others, there will usually  be some reason 
for him [or her] to mobilize his [or her] activity so that it  will convey an 
impression to others which it is in his [or her] interests to convey.’23 Whenever 
we seek to transmit a specific image of ourselves to our human fellows, we 
do so because we have an interest in doing so. 
 
 
5. THE REFERENTIAL SELF 
Human selves are referential selves. Their referential nature is expressed in 
their participation in and dependence on social groups, or  —  in  Goffmanian 
terms — ‘teams’.24 A team, in the Goffmanian sense, is the social reference 
group par excellence. ‘I will use the term “performance team” or, in short, 
“team” to refer to any set of individuals who cooperate in staging  a  single  
routine.’25  Given  that,  in  our  daily  lives,  we  are  — at 
  
 
 
 
 
different times and in different places — immersed in a variety of collective 
acts that can be characterized as routine staging, we are part of a series of 
teams. Humans have to be able to relate to society in order to be able to relate 
to themselves. Performance teams are situationally contingent ensembles of 
actors to which we refer in order to refer to ourselves. We can conceive of 
ourselves as individuals only insofar as we — that is, our existence and 
identity — are recognized by other members of the performance teams to 
which we belong. 
Far from being reducible to a factual given, however, participation in a 
performance team constitutes an interactional process.  A performance  team 
is not only a social fact but also a social  act. 
 
A team, then, may be defined as a set of individuals whose intimate cooperation is 
required if a given projected definition of the situation is to be maintained. A team is a 
grouping, but it is a grouping not in relation to a social structure or social organization 
but rather in relation to an interaction or series of interactions in which the relevant 
definition of the situation is maintained.26 
 
In other words, rather than regarding a performance team as a collection of 
actors who possess a set of structural, organizational or institutional 
characteristics, here it is conceived  of as an ensemble of individuals who  are 
united by the fact that they project roughly the same definition of a particular 
situation onto a socially constructed — and, hence, spatiotemporally confined 
— domain of reality.27 
Insofar as we are constantly thrown into different situations and 
interactions, we are continuously required to function within definitional 
frameworks created by members of particular performance teams. Every 
performance team has an idiosyncratic code of legitimacy, whose existence 
determines both the short-term and the long-term viability  of its  normative 
validity. 
 
One overall objective of any team is to sustain the definition of the situation that its 
performance fosters. This will involve the over-communication of some facts and the 
under-communication of others.28 
 
The existence of a performance team hinges upon the practices carried out 
by interrelated social actors. To the extent that actors’ practices contribute to 
the maintenance of their collective situation, they participate — directly or 
indirectly — in the reproduction of the performance team in relation to which 
they are undertaken in the first place. In brief, social life is composed of 
different performance teams functioning in different situations according to 
different definitions. 
  
 
 
 
 
6. THE SITUATIONAL SELF 
Human selves are situational selves. Given that we are situational selves,  the 
constitution of our subjectivity depends on the social contexts in which we 
find ourselves immersed. The power of context stems from the fact that social 
life is ‘framed ’. When navigating our way through our daily lives, we move 
from situation to situation, from context to context and from ‘frame’  to 
‘frame’. Every socially constructed situation constitutes a coexistential frame 
of reference in which human action unfolds. To be sure, each interactional 
situation requires a praxeological — that is, context-sensitive — definition: 
‘a definition of the situation’.29 The definitions that we generate and exchange 
within a given context provide us not only with an understanding of a 
particular situation but also, at least potentially, with an understanding of the 
world, which we interpret from the angle  of  the  setting in which we are 
embedded in a given point in time. Every communicative encounter with 
others obliges us to produce and to negotiate perspective-laden definitions 
about specific aspects of reality. In fact, we need to be familiar with the — 
implicit or explicit — definitions of the situations in which we are placed in 
order to be able to interact with fellow human actors in a meaningful manner. 
The recognition of others is always filtered through the definitional 
frameworks that we mobilize within the situations 
in which we interact with our fellow human beings. 
When we allow that the individual projects a definition of the situation when he [or she] 
appears before others, we must also see that the others, however passive their role may 
seem to be, will themselves effectively project a definition of the situation by virtue of 
their response to the individual and by virtue of any lines of action they initiate to him [or 
her].30 
The definitions of situations — emerging within and attached to particular 
contexts — contain at least five significant features: 
(a) Definitions of situations are performatively established: the specificity 
of interactional settings depends on the performativity of social 
practices. 
(b) Definitions of situations are intersubjectively established: every time  we 
interact with others we produce or reproduce collective understandings, 
whose existence is indicative of the normativity implicit in social 
encounters. 
(c) Definitions of situations are projectively established: we project 
perceptions and reflections upon the world, thereby confirming that, in 
our daily  interactions  with  other  members  of  society,  our 
interpretations 
  
 
 
have a tangible impact on both the constitution and the development 
of reality. 
(d) Definitions of situations are reciprocally established: an intersubjectively 
established reading of a shared set of circumstances can be maintained 
only insofar as its legitimacy is corroborated by dynamics of reciprocity, 
which are generated by spatiotemporally embedded actors. 
(e) Definitions of situations are, for the most part, implicitly established:   the 
more familiar we are with a socially constructed and symbolically 
mediated comprehension of a particular ensemble of conditions, the more 
likely we are to take its existence — and, indeed, the validity of its 
collectively shared representations — for granted. 
 
Thus, as situational selves, we are capable of functioning in accordance 
with different forms of ‘interactional modus vivendi’,31 that is, with different 
ways of doing things in line with implicitly or explicitly established forms  of  
praxeological  consensus  within   an   intersubjectively   created   state  of 
affairs: 
 
I will refer to this level of agreement as a ‘working consensus’. It is to be understood that 
the working consensus established in one interaction setting will be quite different in 
content from the working consensus established in a different type of setting.32 
 
When we act upon the world, we work upon the world; when we act   with 
others, we work upon others. Every interactional consensus is a working 
consensus. Social encounters cannot escape the definitional specificity of 
their contextual contingency. 
 
When an individual appears before others, he [or she] knowingly and unwittingly projects 
a definition of the situation, of which a conception of himself [or herself] is an important 
part.33 
 
Every conception of the world is, at the same time, a projection on the 
world. The ontology of social objectivity is intimately intertwined with the 
phenomenology of human subjectivity.34 The world that we carry within 
ourselves is marked by the world that surrounds us. The situational self is 
trapped both within society and within itself. Viewed in this light, human 
reality is an eternal odyssey: in our daily lives, we travel from situation to 
situation. As self-conscious entities, we cannot separate our awareness of  our 
existence from our awareness of others’ existence. The situation known as 
human life is, by definition, a social stage of performative actors able to adapt 
to changing circumstances. 
  
 
 
 
 
7. THE REGIONAL SELF 
Human selves are regional selves. Not only do we move from situation to 
situation, but we also move from region to region. ‘A region may be defined 
as any place that is bounded to some degree by barriers to perception.’35 
Hence, within the Goffmanian universe of the social, the concept of region 
refers to any place whose scope of existence is delineated in terms of a 
separation between what is visible and what is hidden to the actors interacting 
within it. According to this binary interpretation, social life consists of both 
regions that are publicly experienced and regions that are privately 
experienced.36 As actors with both performative and preparative capacities, 
we travel back and forth between the ‘front regions’ and the ‘back regions’ 
of our existence.  Whereas  our  public  —  and,  thus,  essentially  observable 
— activities take place in the ‘front region’, our private — and, hence, largely 
concealed — activities are situated in the ‘back region’.37 When we are 
involved in performative acts of the ‘front region’, we are exposed to the 
public eye. When we engage in preparative activities of the ‘back region’, by 
contrast, we are accountable only to the private eye. Of course, ‘front regions’ 
may be stratified in the sense that only particular members or groups of 
society may be in a position to access them; ‘back regions’ tend to be closed 
off in the sense that, normally, only individuals who inhabit them have access 
— that is, privileged access — to them. 
Social life, then, is a constant aller-retour between ‘front  regions’  and  ‘back 
regions’: 
 
[…] it is natural to expect that the passage from the front region to the back region will be 
kept closed to members of the audience or that the entire back region will be kept hidden 
from them. This is a widely practised technique  of  impression  management […].38 
 
The whole point of secluding ourselves into ‘back regions’ is to keep our 
retraction into privacy to ourselves, rather than disclosing it to the general 
audience. Such ‘techniques of privacy’ enable us to sustain the myths of 
‘purity’, ‘spontaneity’ and ‘authenticity’, as they are being performed by 
protagonists of public agency. 
To be clear, impression management is inextricably linked to region 
management: impressions are so powerful because of, not despite, the fact 
that they are based on a partial — and, therefore, limited — perception of the 
world. Paradoxically, to have access to ‘the entire picture’ — that is, to   both 
the ‘front regions’ and the ‘back regions’ of one’s existence — may require 
having to destroy the picture altogether: when we know how actors 
  
 
 
have prepared for a performance, the immaculate aura of originality and 
creativity, celebrated in their ‘front region’, may evaporate in light of 
underlying — and, potentially, disenchanting — mechanisms of calculability 
and habituality, which may serve as motivational driving forces in their ‘back 
region’. Notwithstanding the circumstances under which we relate to, 
attribute meaning to and act upon the world, we are performative selves 
caught up in the construction of different regions. As regional selves, we  are 
eternal commuters39: we travel back and forth between our ‘front regions’ and 
our ‘back regions’. 
 
 
 
8. THE MASKED SELF 
Human selves are masked selves. Every individual has a public persona, 
which differs — in some cases, fundamentally — from the person they are in 
private. To the extent that Goffman seeks to explore the nature of social 
interactions, he is interested in both our public and our private ways of 
engaging with — as well as not engaging with or, indeed, disengaging from — 
our intersubjectively constituted environment. Our public persona forces us 
to ‘adopt a social face’,40 that is, a face that is constructed both through and 
for society: it is constructed through society, because it is developed via our 
interaction with the social world; at the same time, it is constructed for society, 
because it is oriented towards our interaction with the social world. 
Different types of social interaction require that we develop different forms 
of persona: in order to function in different social scenarios, we need to 
cultivate different social roles. Given the multiplicity of social settings to 
which we can be exposed, we have no choice but to develop performative 
personalities that permit us to combine the authenticity of who we actually are 
with the contextual contingency of who we are expected to be . Putting on 
different persona obliges us to wear different masks: we can never disclose 
every single aspect of our personality, as this would undermine our immersion 
in sociality. From a Goffmanian perspective, we are ‘sociable’ insofar as we 
are ‘maskable’: every public performance is a masking performance, since 
human subjects need to play different social roles in order to fit into different 
interactional situations. 
As social beings, we are required to function as both normalized and 
normalizing — and, consequently, disciplinary — creatures. We need to 
acquire a minimal degree of discipline in order to adapt to both the implicit 
and the explicit rules, standards and conventions of our social environment. 
  
 
 
 
 
‘Through social discipline […] a mask of manner can be held in place from 
within.’41  Thus, masks of manner are not simply part of us, but they need    to 
be learned, cultivated and assimilated through the quotidian exercise of social 
discipline.42 Putting on different social masks is tantamount to dressing in 
different clothes. The power of manners is worthless without ritualized 
displays of discipline. Certainly, in the Goffmanian universe, masking 
ourselves is not necessarily a manipulative or distortive undertaking.  Rather, 
it is a supportive and performative precondition for the very possibility of 
social interaction. In every interactional encounter we need to combine the 
relative closure and the relative disclosure of our subjectivity in order to allow 
for our enclosure in society. 
 
 
9. THE IMPRESSION-MANAGING SELF 
Human selves are impression-managing selves.  Individuals seek  to  control  the 
way in which they are perceived by others through a number of performative 
devices. Managing the impressions that others may have of us seems     to give us 
a sense of existential security: ‘impression management’ appears       to endow us 
with a considerable degree of self-control. Ironically, while we develop different 
techniques  of  impression  management  always  in  relation  to others, we create 
them  also  in  relation  to  ourselves. For the impressions we convey to others 
about our personality feed back into the formation of our  identity. 
According to Goffman, we can distinguish three types of impression-
managing  practices:  (a)  defensive  practices,  (b)  protective  practices and 
(c) flexible practices. 
(a) Defensive practices allow actors to generate a sense of dramaturgical 
loyalty: members of the same team need to be able to trust one another 
and to keep secrets to which they, as members of the same group, have 
privileged access. 
(b) Protective practices oblige — or, indeed, permit — the audience to keep 
away from ‘back regions’ or to display tactful inattention, in order to 
avoid exposure to embarrassing situations. 
(c) Flexible practices are symptomatic of the fact that, in most interactional 
situations, performers need to be equipped with a minimum of reciprocal 
perceptivity, which enables them to be sensitive to any hints provided by 
the audience, so that they are able to attune their behaviour if required. 
  
 
 
A social actor needs to be capable of ‘guiding the impression he [or she] 
makes’43 in order to succeed in producing the personality he [or she] fakes. 
To be sure, ‘faking’, in the Goffmanian sense, is not necessarily a synonym 
of ‘misleading’. Rather, the fake of personality stems from the making of 
sociality: the social world is a relationally constituted universe of coexistential 
contingencies. Only by adjusting to coexistential contingencies can our 
personalities flourish in a relationally constructed space of open realities. 
It may even be said that if our special interest is the study of impression management, of 
the contingencies which arise in fostering an impression, and of the techniques for meeting 
these contingencies, then the team and the team-performance may well be the best units 
to take as the fundamental point of reference.44 
In other words, interactional contingencies are praxeological potentialities: 
teams are our quotidian points of reference and vehicles of performance. We 
relate to life by referring to others, and we act in life by performing both with 
and before others. Practices of impression management constitute processes 
of referential performance. 
 
 
10. THE POWER-LADEN SELF 
Human selves are power-laden selves. To be exact, our power to act and to 
interact always depends on our power over the situation in which we act and 
interact. ‘It is often felt that control of the setting is an advantage   during 
interaction.’45 All social relations are permeated by power relations.46 When 
engaging in practices of social interaction, we are involved in processes of 
power structuration. The situational framework within which we are 
embedded has a crucial impact upon the constitution of social interaction. 
Consequently, control over a spatiotemporally confined setting can be a 
precondition for control over a social interaction. Put differently, the power 
to interact with others hinges upon the power over the situation in which 
human performance takes  place. 
The praxeological force of our power to do something cannot be  divorced 
from the contextual force of our power over the particular situation in which 
we seek to do so. If social selves are situated selves and if, furthermore, social  
situations are impregnated with power relations, then  the construction of 
human subjectivity is pervaded by the struggle over authority. The most 
authoritative individual or collective force in a particular setting can 
determine both the course and the outcome of a given social interaction. In 
short, relative control over social situations endows us with 
  
 
 
 
 
a sense of ontological security  in  relation  to  the  interactions  in  which  we 
engage. 
Every interactional scenario is a power scenario. Regardless of how subtle 
or hidden the power mechanisms that underlie our actions may be, social 
practices are conceivable only as power-laden performances. Power may 
operate underneath the surface of social interactionality,  but  it  penetrates the 
entire constitution of human  agency.  Performance without power would be 
pointless, because performance without power would be non-performative. 
Power is performance, and performance is power.47 As the German word 
Macht suggests, the exercise of power is unthinkable without an actor’s ability 
to do and to make (machen) things. Viewed in this light, the presence of power 
manifests itself in the presence of human practices.  We need to influence the 
definitions projected upon social settings, in order to obtain power over the 
roles we, and others, play in our daily interactions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
As illustrated in the previous analysis, Goffman — in his The Presentation  of 
Self in Everyday Life — provides an insightful account of the formation of 
social selves. More specifically, the preceding enquiry has demonstrated that 
Goffman offers a fairly systematic explanatory framework for the 
sociological study of human  personhood. Granted, it  would be far-fetched to 
describe Goffman as ‘a conceptual system builder’, let alone as ‘an advocate 
of grand theory’. As shown above, however, a fine-grained examination of 
Goffman’s key concepts permits us to propose an outline of  a general theory 
of the human self. Following the thematic structure of the foregoing 
investigation, it shall be the task of this concluding section to reflect on 
important  questions  arising  from  Goffman’s  conception  of  the  self. 
1. Goffman rightly emphasizes the fact that human selves are information-
gathering entities. Given the (a) interactional, (b) expectational, (c) 
conventional, (d) judgemental and (e) spatiotemporal constitution of their 
immersion in the world, the act of gathering — implicit or explicit — 
information about others, as well as about the situations in which they 
encounter them, helps individuals to define the parameters underlying 
their engagement with their environments. It is far from obvious, 
however, on what grounds ordinary actors can assess the validity of the 
information on which they rely in their everyday lives. Not only ordinary 
  
 
 
actors themselves, but also the social scientists who study them, may 
distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘correct’ and ‘erroneous’, 
‘reliable’ and ‘unreliable’, ‘revealing’ and ‘concealing’, ‘truthful’ and 
‘misleading’ information. The crucial question for a critical sociology of 
everyday life concerns the extent to which information-gathering 
practices constitute, in many cases,  socio-cognitive  processes  based on 
misconceptions, misperceptions and misrepresentations. Actors, or those 
who study them, may think that they have, or do not have, access to the 
right information permitting them to define a social situation, which — 
as participants — they may experience or which — as observers — they 
may scrutinize. Yet, insofar as the validity of information can be 
evaluated in terms of objective, normative or subjective criteria, 
cognitive reference points remain relatively arbitrary. The symbolic or 
material legitimacy attributed to knowledge-based claims to validity is 
contingent upon the epistemic benchmarks used  to define the rules of 
theoretical or practical  acceptability. 
2. Goffman draws attention the fact that human selves are impression-
dependent entities. As such, they are caught up in a double hermeneutics 
of expressions and impressions. In light of this performative dialectics, 
social actors have the capacity to express themselves — either verbally 
or non-verbally — in a way that influences, more or less effectively, the 
impressions that others may, or may not, have of them. In  this context, 
the questions of (a) whether we want to be who we appear to be and (b) 
whether we want to appear to be who we are can be regarded as central, 
obliging us to face up to one of the most complex predicaments of human 
existence: the stronger one’s explicit assertion of authenticity, the less 
authentic one’s realization of authenticity becomes. To put it bluntly, if 
we try too hard, we run the risk of coming across as — and, effectively, 
degrading ourselves to — wannabes chasing after unachievable goals. 
The situation gets even more complicated when recognizing the 
difficulties attached to the task of identifying objective, normative or 
subjective foundations on which to distinguish between ‘authentic’ and 
‘inauthentic’ facets of our personality. Goffman’s approach accomplishes 
little in the way of shedding light on, let alone solving,  this problem. Yet, 
the search for one’s own, or for someone else’s, authenticity remains, and 
will always remain, a fundamental challenge that interpretive subjects 
face in the meaning-laden construction of everyday life. 
3. Goffman insists upon the sociological significance of the fact that human 
selves are performative entities. As such, they are equipped with
  
 
 
 
 
the capacity both to reveal and to conceal particular aspects of their 
personality. Just as they can seek to disclose those facets of their being 
that they wish to make accessible to others, they can seek to cover up 
those facets of their being that they wish to hide from others. 
Undoubtedly, these are vital dramaturgical techniques, permitting  social 
actors to mobilize the performative resources of their dispositional 
repertoire in order to gain a context-sensitive mode of control  over the 
ways in which they are perceived, placed and treated  by  others. What is 
not evident from Goffman’s analysis, however, is the extent to which in 
reality the distinction between ‘revealing’ and ‘concealing’ practices is 
blurred, rather than clear-cut. It would be naïve to suggest that actors are, 
in some situations, entirely conscious or, in other situations, entirely  
unconscious  of  the  motivational  driving forces behind their  
performances.  Furthermore,  it  would  be  erroneous to draw a neat 
typological line between ‘revealing’ and ‘concealing’ practices, since a 
large degree of how we are (rightly or wrongly) perceived by others 
escapes our control. To the extent that actors project preconceptions, 
judgements and  expectations  upon  one another, they  can never be in 
total control of the ways in which  they may, or may not, be perceived, 
placed and treated by others.  Within spheres of symbolically mediated 
interaction, the highest  degrees of (real or imagined) objectivity cannot 
annihilate the structuring  power  of  both  normativity  and subjectivity,  
through which humans  relate  not  only  to  themselves  but also  to  other 
members of society and, in fact, to all  aspects  of  their internal or external 
reality. The sociological challenge, then, consists in studying ‘revealing’    
and    ‘concealing’    practices    in    terms    of  ambivalent — that is, 
both empowering and disempowering, clear and ambiguous, controllable 
and uncontrollable — facets shaping the development of human life 
forms. 
4. Goffman emphasizes the far-reaching, and multi-layered, implications of 
the fact that human selves are interested entities. All social actions are 
interest-laden insofar as they are pervaded by a series of interests, but 
only some social actions are interest-driven insofar as they are determined 
by particular interests. From a Goffmanian perspective, it is imperative to 
account for people’s capacity — or, in many cases, their lack of capacity 
— to give impressions that are in their interest to convey. What is missing 
from Goffman’s framework, however, is a systematic account of 
interests. Both micro- and macro-sociologists need   to face up to the 
explanatory task of developing a conceptually sophisticated typology of 
interests, capable of doing justice to the pivotal role 
  
 
 
 
 
they play in the construction of human life forms — notably, in highly 
differentiated social formations. When taking on this challenge, the 
following levels of analysis are particularly significant: 
Two-level typology of interests:  
○ public interests vs. private interests 
○ open interests vs. hidden interests 
○ reconcilable interests vs. antagonistic interests 
○ real interests vs. imagined interests 
○ end-in-itself interests vs. means-to-an-end interests 
○ value-based interests vs. instrumental interests 
○ interests ‘in themselves’ vs. interests ‘for   themselves’ 
○ conscious interests vs. unconscious interests 
○ role-dependent interests vs. role-transcendent interests 
○ interested interests vs. disinterested interests 
Three-level typology of interests:  
○ (a) species-constitutive/human interests; (b) group-constitutive/ 
collective interests; (c) actor-constitutive/individual interests 
○ (a) macro-level interests; (b) meso-level interests; (c) micro-level 
interests 
○ (a) societal interests; (b) communitarian interests; (c) personal interests 
○ (a) foundational interests; (b) contingent interests; (c) ephemeral 
interests 
○ (a) intra-role interests; (b) inter-role interests; (c) trans-role  interests 
○ (a) objective interests; (b) normative interests; (c) subjective interests 
Multiple-level typology of interests:  
○ human interests; social interests; cultural interests; political interests; 
economic interests; military interests; demographic interests; 
environmental interests; sexual interests; reproductive interests; 
biological interests; evolutionary interests; moral interests; historical 
interests; etc. 
A critical sociology of action is inconceivable without a comprehensive 
analysis of interests. 
5. Goffman proposes to study social interactions by taking into 
consideration the fact that human selves are referential entities. As such, 
they relate to, attribute meaning to and act upon the world by identifying 
with reference groups, which — owing to their socio-performative 
functions — may be described as ‘teams’. Team members are united  by 
  
 
 
 
 
the fact that, as interrelated individuals, they project a broadly shared 
definition upon a particular situation, enabling them to cooperate in 
staging a set of practices by virtue of which they develop joint patterns of 
action, reflection, bonding  and belonging. The performative nature of 
group building illustrates that, far from being reducible to a set of social 
facts, every team constitutes a dynamic ensemble of individual and 
collective acts. The underlying — quasi-teleological — mission of every 
team, then, is to uphold the symbolically mediated definitions necessary 
to maintain the existence of a situation on the basis of its members’ 
interrelated performances. The successful staging of a situation depends 
as much on the over-communication and exaggeration of some facts as 
on the under-communication and trivialization of others. What needs to 
be given further attention in this respect, however, are the following key 
sociological questions: 
 
(a) Is a team defined, and can its existence be measured, on the basis   of 
objective, normative or subjective criteria (or, indeed, on the basis of 
a combination of these criteria)? 
(b) What is the role of these — objective, normative or subjective — criteria 
in shaping team formation? In particular, who or what determines which 
of these criteria are decisive when bringing a team into existence? 
(c) To what extent do we need to distinguish between different types of team 
membership (such as ‘enforced’ vs. ‘chosen’, ‘ascribed’ vs. ‘achieved’,  
‘rigid’  vs.  ‘playful’,  ‘formal’   vs.   ‘informal’,   ‘overt’ vs. ‘hidden’)? 
(d) To what degree is it possible for ‘teamless’ actors to emerge, to be 
recognized and to survive in the social world? Indeed, is it possible 
for some social situations to come into existence because of, rather 
than despite, the absence of teams (or at least the absence of clearly 
defined teams)? 
(e) What are the normative implications of team building, notably in 
terms of the balance (or imbalance) between individualization and 
socialization processes? Put differently, how much team building is 
good, and how much team building is bad, for individuals in 
particular and society in general? 
(f) Breaking out of the ethnocentric straitjacket of Western sociological 
analysis, to what extent do the multiple functions of teams and team 
building vary between different types of society? Human life forms 
may be characterized as ‘primitive’  or ‘complex’, ‘tight’ or 
  
 
 
 
 
‘loose’, ‘horizontally structured’ or ‘vertically structured’, ‘control-
based’ or ‘freedom-based’, ‘collectivist’ or ‘individualist’, ‘relatively 
homogeneous’ or ‘relatively heterogeneous’.48 A critical sociology of 
the self needs to take on the challenge of shedding light on the extent 
to which the role of teams, and of team formation, varies between 
these (and other) human life forms. 
6. Goffman’s insightful account of everyday life is a  reminder of  the fact 
that human selves are situational entities. Social interactions are 
‘framed’ in the sense that they are embedded in relationally constituted 
settings, which may be described as ‘situations’. Definitions of 
situations are (a) performatively, (b) intersubjectively, (c) projectively, 
(d) reciprocally and (e) — for the most part — implicitly established. 
Individuals need to reach a minimal level of tacit agreement, or 
‘working consensus’, in order to generate, and to sustain, a realm of 
interaction worthy of being characterized as a ‘situation’. Yet, the 
preceding reflections on the limitations inherent in Goffman’s 
conception of ‘teams’ apply, in a similar manner, to his conception     of 
‘situation’: 
(a) Is a situation defined, and can its existence be measured, on the  basis 
of objective, normative or subjective criteria (or, indeed, on the basis 
of a combination of these criteria)? 
(b) What is the role of these — objective, normative or subjective — criteria 
in shaping a situation? In particular,  who  or what  determines  which 
of these criteria are decisive when bringing a situation into existence? 
(c) To what extent do we need to distinguish between different types    of 
situation (such as ‘enforced’ vs. ‘chosen’, ‘ascribed’ vs. ‘achieved’, 
‘rigid’ vs. ‘playful’,  ‘formal’  vs.  ‘informal’,  ‘overt’  vs. ‘hidden’)? 
(d) To what degree is it possible for ‘situationless’ actors to emerge, to 
be recognized and to survive in the social world? Indeed, is it possible 
for some teams to come into existence because of, rather than despite, 
the absence of situations (or at least the absence of clearly defined 
situations)? 
(e) What are the normative implications of situation building, notably in 
terms of the balance (or imbalance) between individualization and 
socialization processes? Put differently, how much situation building 
is good, and how much situation building is bad, for individuals in 
particular and society in general? 
  
 
 
 
 
(f) Breaking out of the ethnocentric straitjacket of Western sociological 
analysis, to what extent do the multiple functions of situations and 
situation building vary between different types of society? A critical 
sociology of the self needs to take on the challenge of shedding light 
on the extent to which the role of situations, and of situation 
formation, varies between human life forms. 
7. Goffman highlights the sociological implications of the fact  that  human 
selves are regional entities. Spatiotemporally positioned actors, as they 
navigate their way through the social world, move not only   from 
situation to situation but also from region to region. A region,       in the 
Goffmanian sense, can be defined as any place whose existence is 
restricted by barriers, as well as kept alive by processes, of perception. 
Crucial, in this respect, is Goffman’s distinction between ‘front regions’  
and  ‘back  regions’.  The  former  are  produced  by   our public — and, 
thus, essentially observable — activities. The latter are generated by our 
private — and, hence, largely concealed — activities. In most societies, 
especially in highly differentiated ones, we are required to travel back and 
forth between our ‘front regions’ and our ‘back regions’. 
What needs to be studied with more precision, however, is the extent 
to which the boundaries between ‘front regions’ and ‘back regions’ are 
increasingly blurred, particularly in complex societies, in which actors 
are expected to be able to take on numerous roles — often in a 
contradictory and tension-laden manner. Preparative activities can take 
place in ‘front regions’ (for instance, studying for an exam in a library, 
training for a public competition in a park, doing homework at a school, 
etc.). Performative activities can take place in ‘back regions’ (for 
instance, singing under the shower, putting on a deceiving role before 
one’s partner in private, engaging in sexual intercourse in the domestic 
sphere, etc.). The picture gains an even higher level of complexity when 
taking into account the impact of technology — notably,  of  the  Internet 
— on the degree to which the boundaries between ‘front regions’ and 
‘back regions’ — and, consequently,  between  ‘public’  and ‘private’ — 
are increasingly blurred. In the ‘digital age’,49 the production, distribution 
and consumption of both material and  symbolic  goods cut across 
traditional social boundaries, including the ones established between 
‘front regions’ and ‘back regions’. A critical sociology of the self needs 
to take behavioural, ideological and institutional 
transformations — at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels — into 
consideration, when aiming to capture how human actors operate in an 
  
 
 
 
 
environment shaped not only  by ‘front-regional’ and ‘back-regional’  
but also, to a growing extent, by ‘trans-regional’  dynamics. 
8. Goffman underscores the sociological significance of the fact that human 
selves are masked —  that  is,  self-masking  —  entities.  In  most — if 
not all — societies, every individual develops a public persona, which 
may differ — in some cases, fundamentally — from the person they are 
in private. The ‘social face’ that human actors take on reflects an 
appearance that they construct — and, frequently, have to readjust — 
when exposed to others in the public domains of their lives. To a large 
extent, the capacity to put on a social mask requires the ability to 
discipline one’s body, thereby mobilizing one’s dispositional resources 
in  a  socially  acceptable  —   and,   hence,   context-sensitive — manner. 
Far from being ingrained in people’s personality, then, social masks are 
adapted, and can be changed, by those who   make use of them in relation 
to particular settings. Hardly any sociologist would deny the centrality of 
people’s ability to put on ‘social faces’ and ‘social masks’ when 
interacting with others in  public environments. 
What is open to debate, however, is what happens when one’s social 
face or mask becomes an integral part, if not the cornerstone, of one’s 
personality and, at the same time, one’s personality is articulated mainly, 
if not exclusively, through one’s social face or mask. Once again, then, 
we are confronted with the question of what, if anything, constitutes 
human authenticity. In societies in which one’s profession continues to 
represent,  for  many,  a  raison  d’eˆtre  and,  therefore,  the  ontological 
foundation of their identity, work-obsessed individuals may, in extreme 
cases, build their whole sense of who they are around the public persona 
they have developed when adopting the role that may be required from 
them while pursuing their occupation. Certainly, it would be 
presumptuous to regard some people’s conscious or unconscious desire 
to base large — if not, almost all — parts of their identity on their public 
persona as ‘inauthentic’, or at least as ‘less authentic’ than those for 
whom their social face is little more than a performative act of image 
management. In fact, one may turn the argument on its head by positing 
that, insofar as we are social beings, the identities that we acquire in 
public settings are no less, and no more, ‘authentic’ than those that we 
develop in private settings. For personal authenticity is ultimately defined 
by that with which an individual feels most ‘comfortable’, ‘natural’ and 
‘him- or herself’. The question of authenticity is too central   an issue — 
indeed, a real-life concern — to be left to philosophers and, 
  
 
 
 
 
thus, ignored by sociologists of the self. It would require the launching   of 
a comprehensive research programme to explore the objective, normative 
and subjective dimensions of human authenticity, including the multiple 
levels at which these dimensions are interrelated and, as an ensemble, serve 
a fundamental — that is, socio-ontological — function in the construction 
of selfhood. 
9. Goffman stresses the sociological significance of the fact that human selves   are 
impression-managing entities. As such, they aim to exercise at least a minimal 
amount of influence on, if not control over, the ways in  which they are perceived 
by others, employing several performative devices, techniques and  strategies.  
As  elucidated  above,  three  types  of  practices  oriented  towards  impression  
management  are  particularly important: 
(a) defensive practices, permitting actors to develop a sense of trust, 
solidarity and loyalty with other team members, with whom they may 
share secrets and confidential information, to which they have 
privileged access; 
(b) protective practices, allowing actors to ensure that their audience is 
not granted access to their ‘back region’, as this may cause — in the 
best-case scenario — awkwardness and embarrassment or — in the 
worst-case scenario — dishonour and humiliation; 
(c) flexible practices, enabling actors to take on board any tacit advice, 
and to be sensitive to any hints, provided by their audience, giving 
them the opportunity to adjust their behaviour to the (implicit or 
explicit) demands that are thrown at them within a given situation. 
Yet, irrespective of how sophisticated an actor’s dispositional  devices, 
techniques and strategies may be, human performances always take place 
in socio-culturally specific environments. Unsurprisingly, all individual 
or collective efforts aimed at influencing intersubjectively generated 
impressions are contextually contingent upon relationally constituted 
settings. In some cultures and subcultures, practices oriented towards 
impression management play a greater role than in others. The picture 
gains in complexity if we account for the fact that human performances 
are intersectionally shaped by various sociological variables (such as 
class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability). In some social groups, practices 
oriented towards impression management play a greater role than in 
others. More importantly, actors develop dispositional devices, 
techniques and strategies in relation to the numerous positions they 
occupy in different social spaces. A critical sociology of the self,  
therefore,  needs  to  account  for  the  relationally   defined 
  
 
 
 
 
specificity of human agency, if it seeks to grasp the multiple ways in 
which individuals engage in attempts to manage the impressions they 
convey when interacting with other members of society. 
10. Within Goffman’s sociological framework, there is little, if any, room for 
the possibility of denying the fact that human selves are power-laden 
entities. People’s capacity to act and to interact is contingent upon their 
ability to exercise a minimal amount of influence upon, if not command 
of, the situation in which they are exposed to the presence of others. 
Control over a setting, regardless of whether it is perceived as relative   or 
as absolute by those who exercise or those who are affected by it, tends 
to be tantamount to a performative advantage during social interactions. 
Those who have — or are, at least, perceived to have — the upper hand 
over others tend to be in a position to set the agenda and, hence, to 
determine the course of action within a given situation. 
Yet, the fact that every human action is power-laden does not mean that 
every human action is power-driven. Put differently, all human actions are 
permeated by power, but only some of them are motivated by power. The 
task with which a critical sociology of the self is confronted, then, consists 
in accounting for the role that power dynamics play in the construction of 
everyday life. Faced with this explanatory challenge, it is essential to make 
a case for socio-ontological realism, in order to avoid falling into the traps 
of socio-ontological pessimism and socio-ontological optimism. Socio-
ontological pessimism is based on the fatalistic assumption that human 
actions are not only power-permeated but also, unavoidably, power-
motivated. Socio-ontological optimism is founded on the idealistic  
assumption  that  human  actions  can  transcend  the  influence  of power 
relations insofar as they emanate from allegedly non-instrumental — such 
as communicative, pristine or altruistic — considerations. Socio-ontological 
realism, by contrast, is prepared to take both the dark and the bright sides of 
human reality seriously, recognizing that both the pursuit and the critique of 
power substantially contribute to the tension-laden development of society. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  Goffman (1971 [1959]). 
2. See, for example: Baert (1998, pp. 75—82); Branaman (2001); Burns (1992); 
Ditton (1980); Drew and Wootton (1988); Fine and Smith (2000); Giddens (1988); 
Jacobsen (2010, 2015); Manning (1991, 1992); Miller (1984, 1987); Mohren (2008); 
  
 
 
 
 
Plummer (1991,  1996); Raffel (2013); Rawls (1989); Scheff (2006); Schegloff    (1988); 
Smith (2006, 1999); Treviño (2003); Willems (1997); Williams (1983, 1988). 
3. See, for example: 
 
— Baert (1998, p. 80): ‘It is worth mentioning that Goffman did not intend    to 
be a social theorist, and that he was actually rather hostile to the enterprise 
of grand theory.’ 
— Branaman (2001, pp. 96 and 99): ‘He [Goffman] did not believe sociology 
had advanced to the stage of constructing  theories  and  hypotheses and this 
did not think there was such a thing as a social theory at all. […] Goffman 
has been everything to everybody!’ 
— Giddens (1988, p. 250): ‘Goffman would not ordinarily be ranked among the 
major social theorists.’ 
— Manning (1992, pp. 2—3): ‘[…] despite his enthusiasm for this general 
theory, he also remained extremely sceptical about the possibility of 
discovering such a general theory.’ 
 
4. See, for instance: Goffman (1961, 1963a, 1963b, 1968 [1961], 1969, 1970, 
1971 [1959], 1971, 1972 [1967], 1975 [1974], 1979, 1981, 1983). 
5. On this  point,  see,  for  example:  Baert  (1998,  pp.  75—82);  Giddens  (1988,  p. 
260); Manning (1991, 1992, pp. 8, 15—16, 40—41 and 143); Schegloff (1988, esp.  pp. 
90—92); Williams (1988, pp. 74, 77 and  85). 
6. On the difference between Gesellschaftstheorie and Gemeinschaftstheorie, see, 
for example, Susen (2013a, p. 89). 
7.  Baert (1998, p. 77). 
8. See, for example: ibid., pp. 75—82; Giddens (1988, p. 260); Manning (1991, 
1992, pp. 8, 15—16, 40—41 and 143); Schegloff (1988, esp. pp. 90—92); Williams 
(1988, pp. 74, 77 and 85). 
9.  Baert (1998, p. 76). 
10. On the concept of ‘the self’, see, for example: Bakhurst  and  Sypnowich (1995); 
Blumer (1969); Burkitt (2008 [1991]); Crossley (1996); Giddens (1991); Goffman 
(1971 [1959]); Jenkins (2008 [1996]); Joas (1987); Mead (1967 [1934]); Miller 
(1987); Nuyen (1998); Plummer (1991, 1996); Raffel (2013); Rawls (1989); Schrag 
(1997); Seigel (1999); Stead and Bakker (2010); Susen (2007, pp. 82, 84, 91, 91—94, 
100n.119, 118, 129n.56, 165, 185, 192—198, 216, 306 and 311); Susen (2010, 2015, 
esp. pp. 110—123); Zhao (2005). 
11. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 13). 
12.  Ibid., p. 13 (italics added). 
13.  Ibid., p. 22. 
14.  Ibid., p. 23. 
15. Ibid., p. 14 (italics added). 
16. Ibid., p. 14 (italics in original). 
17. On this point,  see,  for  example:  Susen  (2011a,  p.  451),  Susen  (2011b, 
pp. 40—42), Susen (2015, pp. 42, 51, 99, 116, 158, 167, 259 and 264). 
18.  Baert (1998, p.  77). 
19. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 74) (italics added). 
20. On the concept of ‘interest’ in sociological analysis, see, for instance, 
Swedberg (2005). 
  
 
 
 
 
21. On  this point, see,  for example,  Susen (2014, pp. 16 and 23). On  the concept   of 
‘interest’,  see, for instance, Susen  (2015, pp. 3, 7, 32, 57, 65, 67, 68, 74, 90,  95,   126, 
151, 192, 196, 210, 212, 220, 224, 226, 238, 247, 277, 279, 281, 294n22, 298n41 and 
309n358). 
22. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 18) (italics added). 
23. Ibid., pp. 15—16 (italics added). 
24. See, for example, ibid., p. 85. 
25. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 85) (italics added). 
26. Ibid., p. 108 (italics added). 
27. On this point, see, for example: Susen (2012b, p. 712) (point c), Susen (2014 
[2012], p. 192) (point c), Susen (2013b, pp. 349—350) (point 13). 
28. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 141) (italics added). 
29.  Ibid., p. 20. 
30. Ibid., p. 20 (italics added). 
31. Ibid., p. 21 (italics in original). 
32. Ibid., p. 21 (italics added). 
33. Ibid., pp. 234—235. 
34. On this point, see, for example: Susen (2013c, esp. pp. 201—218). See also 
Susen (2013d). 
35. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 109) (italics added). 
36. On this point, see, for example, Susen (2011b, esp. pp. 38—42). 
37.  Baert (1998, p. 78). 
38. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 116). 
39. On this metaphor, see, for example, Susen (2010, p. 75). 
40. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 19). 
41.  Ibid., p. 65. 
42. On this point, see, for example: Susen (2012a, pp. 290 and 310); Susen (2014, 
pp. 18—19 and 24); Susen (2015, pp. 17, 27, 118 and 119). See also, for instance: 
Foucault (1979 [1975]); Moore and Casper (2015); Shilling (2012 [1993]); Turner 
(2006); Wagner (1992, 1994). 
43. Goffman (1971 [1959], p. 19). 
44. Ibid., pp. 85—86 (italics added). 
45.  Ibid., p. 98. 
46. On this point, see Susen (2014). See also, for example, Susen (2008a) and Susen 
(2008b). In addition, see, for instance: Browne and Susen (2013c, 2014, esp. pp. 208—
218); Susen (2013d, 2015, pp. 10, 37, 43, 47, 70, 78, 108, 117, 126, 152, 157, 174, 184, 
218, 243, 245, 266, 274 and 304n249). 
47. On this point, see Susen (2014, pp. 14—15). 
48. See Triandis (1996, esp. pp. 408—409). (According to Triandis’s typology, the 
following main ‘cultural syndromes’ can be identified: tightness, cultural complexity, 
active-passive, honour, collectivism, individualism and vertical and horizontal 
relationships.) 
49. On the ‘digital age’, see, for example: Athique (2013); Baym (2014 [2010]); 
Belk and Llamas (2013); Burda (2011); Junge, Berzina, Scheiffele, Westerveld and 
Zwick (2013); Negroponte (1995); Runnel, Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, Viires and Laak 
(2013); Westera (2013); Zhao (2005). 
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